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he federal-provincial fiscal equalization system
plays a very important role in Canadian public
finances. This report describes this program, which
has recently undergone major changes.We also pro-
vide some background on intergovernmental
finances in Canada to put the equalization system in
its constitutional, historic and economic contexts.
The report focuses on the main federal equalization
grant program to the provincial governments and
discusses only in passing the other major federal
transfers to the provinces. It does not cover the fed-
eral transfers to the territorial governments, which
are determined under a different program, or the
transfers that the ten provincial governments make
to municipal governments.1
Background on federal-provincial finances in
Canada
The federal-provincial equalization program began
in 1957 in response to the desire of the two largest
provinces in Canada, Ontario and Quebec, to
reassert their control over their revenues and recom-
mence levying income taxes. (During World War II,
the federal government had taken control of all of
the major tax bases and distributed grants in lieu of
taxes to the provinces.) Given the inequality in the
fiscal capacities of the provinces,the move to greater
provincial taxation would have resulted in large vari-
ations in the revenue-raising abilities of the
provinces. Hence, the federal government imple-
mented the first equalization program to reduce the
fiscal disparities of the provinces. The initial equal-
ization program was based on three revenue sources
– personal income tax, corporate income tax, and
succession duties – and the standard of equalization
was based on the average fiscal capacities of the two
richest provinces at the time, Ontario and British
Columbia. A history of the evolution of the equal-
ization program is contained in annex of the report
of Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial
Formula Financing (2006b).
The importance of the equalization program was
recognized in 1982 in the following provision of the
Canadian constitution:
Parliament and the Government of Canada are
committed to the principle of making equalization
payments to ensure that provincial governments
have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably com-
parable levels of public services at reasonably com-
parable levels of taxation.
While the obligation of the federal government to
make equalization payments to the provinces was
enshrined in the Canadian constitution in 1982, the
wording is sufficiently ambiguous that it gives the
federal government considerable flexibility in deter-
mining the distribution and the level of the equaliza-
tion payments.
Other aspects of the Canadian constitutional
arrangements have also shaped the equalization pro-
gram.These include:
The provinces have “exclusive responsibility” for
health, education, and social welfare. These are the
“big ticket” items for modern governments, and
responsibility for these activities requires substantial
amounts of revenue. Major differences in the provi-
sion of these key services, because of differences in
the revenue-raising abilities of the provinces, would
be inconsistent with the spirit of section 36(1) of the
Canadian constitution which enjoins the federal and
provincial governments to promote “equal opportu-
nities for the well-being of Canadians…”.
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1 For information on transfers to the territorial governments, see
Department of Finance (2007a and 2007c) and Expert Panel on
Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing (2006a).Notwithstanding the assignment of exclusive respon-
sibility of key functions to the provinces, the courts
have determined that the federal government can
offer conditional grants to the provinces to promote
national programs in areas of provincial jurisdiction,
such as health care, post-secondary education, infra-
structure, and other social programs.This is referred
to as the federal “spending power”, and it provides
the basis for the other major federal transfer pro-
grams – currently called the Canada Health Transfer
(CHT) and the Canada Social Transfer (CST).
The constitution restricts the provincial govern-
ments to levying “direct taxation within the pro-
vince”.This means that the provinces are not able to
levy taxes on imports to the province, as this would
restrict the free flow of goods and services within the
federation. In practice, the provincial governments
have extensive tax powers,and they impose taxes on
all of the major tax bases,including personal and cor-
porate income taxes, sales taxes, payroll taxes, excise
taxes, and property taxes. The federal government
also co-occupies these tax fields, with the exception
of property taxes. The Canadian tax system is char-
acterized by a high percentage of revenue raised at
the subnational level and the joint occupation of the
main tax bases by the two levels of government.
The Canadian constitution also gives the provincial
governments ownership and control over natural
resources. Natural resource revenues, especially
from royalties on the production of oil and natural
gas,have become major sources of revenue for some
provincial governments, especially in Alberta,
Saskatchewan, and British Columbia. Two eastern
provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova
Scotia, have also negotiated the right to receive rev-
enues from offshore oil and gas fields. Revenues
from hydro-electric developments are also impor-
tant for Quebec. Other provinces receive relatively
little resource revenues, and this inequality in the
distribution of resource revenues,combined with the
absence of federal revenues from these sources, has
created major problems in determining the appro-
priate level of equalization payments.
Municipal governments do not have an independent
status in the Canadian constitution. The provincial
governments have complete control over the munic-
ipal sector and can create, reform, or merge any
municipal governments within their boundaries.The
financing of municipal governments is a provincial
responsibility, and any equalization programs at the
municipal level are the responsibility of their respec-
tive provincial governments. The property tax is the
main source of own-revenues for municipal govern-
ments, but most municipal governments are heavily
reliant on transfers from their provincial govern-
ments. In 2006, transfers were the single largest
source of income for local governments at 42.7 per-
cent of the total.Thus,in some respects,the provincial
governments can be viewed as conduits for revenues
raised at the federal level to local governments.
Key characteristics of the equalization program
Although the equalization program has evolved over
time and has undergone recent major changes,certain
key characteristics of the program have endured.
Equalization payments are lump-sum grants that
have been largely determined within a representa-
tive tax system (RTS) framework,although the num-
ber of tax bases used in the calculation of equaliza-
tion payments and the equalization standard has var-
ied over time. Broadly speaking, the equalization
program has been formula driven, with federal gov-
ernment determining the parameters of the formula.
Limitations on the size of the equalization payments
have occasionally been imposed, and the fixing of
the size of the equalization pool in 2005 was a major
source of discontent that led to a major reassessment
and revamping of the equalization program in 2007.
Equalization payments have not been based on mea-
sures of fiscal need, such as are used to determine
equalization payments in Australia. The reasons for
not incorporating a needs component in the equal-
ization calculations include the conceptual and sta-
tistical problems in defining need, the potential dis-
tortions in provincial policies that might arise if the
needs components could be affected by provincial
policies, and the desire to limit federal interference
in areas of provincial jurisdiction.
Equalization payments are only made to the
provinces with relatively low fiscal capacities.
Ontario, with around 40 percent of the population,
has never received equalization payments. Alberta
has not received equalization payments since the
early 1960s when resource revenues were included in
the calculation of fiscal capacity. Other provinces,
such as Saskatchewan and British Columbia, have
been recipients of equalization in some years, but
they have lost their equalization entitlement when
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economic conditions have improved. Table 1 shows
the equalization payments to the recipient provinces
since 1997–98.The percentage of the total population
that resides in the recipient provinces has ranged
from 51.8 percent in 2001–02 to 37.1 percent in
2008–09. Note that there have been at times large
fluctuations in the equalization payments to the
provinces. For example, Quebec’s equalization pay-
ment fell by $1.7 billion or 30 percent between
2000–01 and 2003–04, but it returned to the earlier
level by 2006–07. As Figure 1 shows, total equaliza-
tion payments as a percentage of GDP have declined
from an average of 1.09 percent in the 1990s to less
than 0.80 percent in 2006.
The advent of the offshore oil
and gas revenues to New-found-
land and Labrador and Nova
Scotia would have meant that
these provinces would also lose
equivalent equalization entitle-
ments. The federal government
signed the Off Shore Accords in
2005 with these provinces to
prevent this from happening.
The federal government argued
that these special grants to offset
the loss of equalization pay-
ments were justified because of
the low levels of economic de-
velopment and high indebted-
ness of these provinces, but these offsets led to accu-
sations that the federal government was making
“special deals” for certain provinces.
Equalization payments are funded out of the gener-
al revenues of the federal government. Provincial
governments do not contribute to the funding of the
program. Recipient provinces are equalized up to
some standard level of fiscal capacity – the ability to
raise a certain per capita revenue by levying average
provincial tax rates – but provincial governments
with relatively high fiscal capacity are not “equalized
down”. The residents of Ontario contribute about
43 percent of total federal tax revenues and there-
Table 1 
Equalization payments in millions of dollars
a)
Fiscal  Year NL PEI NS NB Que Man Sask BC Total
1997–98  1,093  238 1,302 1,112 4,745 1,053  196  –  9,738 
1998–99  1,068  238 1,221 1,112 4,394 1,092  477  –  9,602 
1999–00  1,169  255 1,290 1,183 5,280 1,219  379  125  10,900 
2000–01  1,112  269 1,404 1,260 5,380 1,314  208  –  10,948 
2001–02  1,055  256 1,315 1,202 4,679 1,362  200  240  10,310 
2002–03  875  235 1,122 1,143 4,004 1,303  106  71  8,859 
2003–04  766  232 1,130 1,142 3,764 1,336  –  320  8,690 
2004–05  762  277 1,313 1,326 4,155 1,607  652  682  10,774 
2005–06  861  277 1,344 1,348 4,798 1,601  82  590  10,900 
2006–07  632  291 1,386 1,451 5,539 1,709  13  260  11,282 
2007–08  477  294 1,465 1,477 7,160 1,826  226  –  12,925 
2008–09  158
b) 322  1,465
c) 1,584 8,028 2,063  –  –  13,620 
$  per capita 313  2,310 1,565 2,111 1,038 1,732  –  – 
Shares of pay-
ments (%)  1.2 2.4 10.8 11.6 58.9 15.1  –  –  100.0 
Population share
(%)  1.5 0.4  2.8  2.3 23.4  3.6  37.1
a)The names andabbreviations of the provinces are given inTable 2. On January 31, 2008 a Canadiandollar was worth
US$1.01 or 0.679. – 
b)In addition, Newfoundland and Labrador will receive $742 million or $1,469 per capita under the
Offshore Accords. –
c)In addition, Nova Scotia will receive $106 million or $113 per capita under the Offshore Accords.
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any increase in the equalization
payments,even though their pro-




Equalization grants are a key
part of the Canadian fiscal ar-
chitecture but other transfer
programs, notably the Canada
Health Transfer (CHT) and the
Canada Social Transfer (CST),
actually funnel more money to
the provincial governments.
Figure 2 shows that equalization grants represented
about 27 percent of the total cash transfers to the
provinces in 2007–08. The Canada Health Transfer,
which provides grants to all of the provinces to aid in
the funding of provincial health care programs,is the
largest grant program, representing 45.5 percent of
the total cash transfers. The Canada Social Transfer
nominally helps fund post-secondary education and
provincial social programs. It has become an equal
per capita cash transfer to all the provinces and rep-
resents just under 21 percent of total transfers.
Table 2 shows the provinces’ equalization grants in
2006–07 as a percentage of their total revenues.The
government of Prince Edward Island relies on equal-
ization grants for almost a quarter of its revenues.
Quebec, which is the largest recipient province,
received 9.2 percent of its revenues from equaliza-
tion grants. The table also shows total federal cash
transfers to the provinces as a percentage of their
total revenues in 2006–07. The provinces in the
Atlantic region receive more than a third of their
revenues from transfers from the federal govern-
ment, while the two richest provinces, Ontario
(15.5 percent) and Alberta (8.1 percent), are much
less reliant on federal transfers.
Recent changes to the equalization system
In light of the problems and controversies arising out
of the 2005 changes to the equalization program and
the Atlantic Accords, the federal government under
Prime Minister Paul Martin appointed an expert
panel to study the equalization
system and recommend changes.
The Expert Panel, under the
chairmanship of Al O’Brien, a
former deputy provincial trea-
surer in Alberta, presented its
report in May 2006.2 The Expert
Panel (2006b) report contained
an extensive analysis of the
equalization system and made a
number of recommendations for
significant changes to the sys-















MAJOR FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL TRANSFERS IN CANADA
2007–2008
Source: Dept of Finance (2007c, Table 12, p. 67).
Figure 2
Table 2 
Provincial governments’ reliance on federal transfers in 2006–07 
Equalization 











Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) 11.9 33.0
Prince Edward Island (PEI) 24.4 39.1
Nova Scotia (NS) 19.4 36.1
New Brunswick (NB) 22.4 38.0
Quebec (Que) 9.2 18.3
Ontario (Ont) 0.0 15.5
Manitoba (Man) 15.7 30.4
Saskatchewan (Sask) 0.2 16.1
Alberta (Alta) 0.0 8.1
British Columbia (BC) 0.7 16.5
Source: Calculations based on data in Dept of Finance (2007b) and Table 1.
2 The Expert Panel’s reports, commen-
taries on the equalization system by aca-
demics and public policy experts, and
other background documents can be
accessed at the website http://www.eqtff-
pfft.ca/index.asp. See also the report of
the Council of the Federation (2006) on
fiscal imbalances in Canada.CESifo DICE Report 1/2008 7
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tem. In its March 2007 budget, the new federal gov-
ernment under Prime Minister Stephen Harper
adopted most of the changes proposed by the Expert
Panel. Among the most significant changes to the
equalization system are the following:
The equalization standard is now based on the aver-
age fiscal capacity of all 10 provinces instead of the
five province standard which had been used to cal-
culate entitlements since 1982. The adoption of the
10 province (or national average) standard increas-
es the equalization standard because Alberta’s fiscal
capacity is now included in the computation of the
standard. Under the new equalization program,
total payments for 2007–08 are $1.5 billion higher
than in 2006–07.
The computation of equalization entitlements has
been simplified by reducing the number of tax bases
used to calculate fiscal capacity from 33 to five – the
personal income tax base, the business income tax
base, the property tax base, the sales tax base, and
50 percent of natural resource revenues.This means,
for example, that the sales tax base will be used to
calculate the fiscal capacity based on revenues from
a variety of provincial taxes, such as tobacco taxes,
gasoline and diesel fuel taxes, the sale of alcoholic
beverages and motor vehicle licenses, in addition to
the general sales taxes. The main argument for this
change was simplification and the fact that some of
the bases were difficult to measure accurately.
The revised treatment of natural resources – the
50 percent inclusion rate and the use of revenues
instead of “bases”to calculate fiscal capacity – is par-
ticularly significant because this has been a source of
controversy since the inception of the equalization
program. The 50 percent inclusion rate, which was
recommended by the Expert Panel, represents a
compromise. On the one hand, some argue that all
provincial revenue sources constitute fiscal capacity
and therefore natural resource revenues should be
fully included in the calculation of the average fiscal
capacity of the provinces. On the other hand, partial
inclusion, which has been the norm since the equal-
ization program was started, has been justified
because full inclusion would greatly increase the
amount of equalization that would have to be paid to
the recipient provinces. This burden would largely
fall on the taxpayers in Ontario, which receives little
in the way of resource revenues.It is also argued that
full inclusion would effectively eliminate the net
benefit that a recipient province receives from its
natural resources, because its equalization payments
would be “clawed-back” when it received more re-
source revenues. This would effectively negate
provincial ownership of natural resources which is
enshrined in the constitution. Thirdly, full inclusion
would reduce incentives for provinces to develop or
price their natural resources in an efficient manner.
The other major change to the resource component
of the equalization formula is the use of resource
revenues, instead of resource tax bases (volume or
value measures of resources produced in a pro-
vince), to calculate fiscal capacity. The justification
for this change is that there has been a proliferation
of natural resource bases in the equalization pro-
gram because different types of resources, for exam-
ple a barrel of heavy oil versus a barrel of conven-
tional oil,can yield different levels of economic rent,
and therefore represent different “fiscal capacities”.
However, the proliferation of resource bases meant
that the adverse incentives to develop or price re-
sources have became more significant because the
narrowly defined bases are often concentrated in
only one province. In addition, some of the resource
bases were entirely “fictional”. For example, the sale
of exploration rights, a major source of revenue for
the Alberta government, had to be converted into a
tax base, even though it was a sale, not a tax. Com-
bining the resource revenues from 14 different nat-
ural resources,including hydroelectricity,oil and gas,
and forestry,along with the 50 percent inclusion rate,
is meant to address these issues.
Another major change in the calculation of fiscal
capacity is the use of market-values for the residen-
tial property tax base. Previously a proxy for the
property tax base had been used based on economic
indicators that were thought to approximate the rev-
enue-raising ability of the property tax.A proxy was
used because historically assessment and valuation
practices for property taxes had varied widely across
provinces. In recent years, most provinces have
adopted market values as the basis for levying resi-
dential property taxes, and the logic of using market
values in the equalization formula became very
strong. (The procedure for computing fiscal capacity
based on market values is complex because it has
been observed that most municipalities that have
high per capita property tax bases levy significantly
lower property tax rates.) The switch to market-val-
ues for residential property taxes has resulted in a
substantial increase in the measured fiscal capacity
of British Columbia, where property values in theGreater Vancouver area are rel-
atively high, and a correspond-
ing decrease in the relative fiscal
capacity of Quebec,where prop-
erty values are relatively low.As
a consequence,Quebec’s entitle-
ment to equalization has in-
creased. Further reforms in this
area are required because the
fiscal capacities arising from
commercial, industrial and agri-
culture property taxes are still
based on a proxy.
A further simplification is that
equalization entitlements will be
based on a three year weighted
moving average of measured fis-
cal capacities with a two year lag. For example, the
equalization entitlements for 2007–08 are based on
the fiscal capacities of the provinces in 2003–04,
2004–05,and 2005–06,with the first two years having
25 percent weights and the final year a 50 percent
weight. This change was introduced because under
the previous system,given the lags in data collection,
it took up to 42 months before a province received
final confirmation of its equalization payment. The
new method will make it easier for recipient pro-
vinces to make budget plans and will reduce fluctua-
tions in payments.
The final major change to the computation of equal-
ization was the introduction of a fiscal capacity cap
to ensure that a recipient province’s fiscal capacity
with equalization does not exceed that of any non-
recipient province. For example, it is possible that
with only 50 percent of resource revenues included
in the measurement of fiscal capacity a province,
such as Saskatchewan, would be eligible for equal-
ization payments and have a fiscal capacity that
exceeded Ontario, which would not receive equal-
ization.This is viewed as fundamentally unfair since
Ontario taxpayers fund a substantial share of the
equalization program. To avoid this situation, a
receiving province’s fiscal capacity with equalization
payments is capped at the fiscal capacity of the low-
est non-receiving province, which at this time is
Ontario.
Figure 3 shows the fiscal capacities of the provinces
for 2008–09 and illustrates how the fiscal capacity
cap operates. The first solid bar shows the fiscal
capacity of each province using the new standard
with the 50 percent inclusion of resource revenues.
The average fiscal capacity is $6,731 per capita.
Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta have fiscal
capacities that are in excess of this standard and
therefore are not eligible for equalization payments.
Equalization entitlements are calculated as the gaps
between the solid bar and the solid line which repre-
sents the standard fiscal capacity. Then the fiscal
capacities of the provinces are calculated with
100 percent inclusion of the resource revenues. The
fiscal capacity of the lowest non-receiving province
is Ontario at $6,871 per capita.Since Saskatchewan’s
fiscal capacity with 100 percent inclusion of resource
revenues (even without the equalization entitlement
calculated at the first stage) is higher than Ontario’s
fiscal capacity, Saskatchewan is not eligible for
equalization payments in 2008–09. In the case of
Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia,
equalization payments are reduced by the cap
because of the Offshore Accord payments.The enti-
tlements of all of the other provinces are unaffected
by the fiscal capacity cap in 2008–09.
Summary
In the view of most public policy analysts, the 2007
revisions to the equalization system, based on the
recommendations of the Expert Panel, represent an
improvement over the previous system and address
in a balanced manner the irreconcilable goals and
controversial issues that have grown up around the
equalization program in Canada. As with any new
major program, there will be unforeseen problems
with the changes to a complex system and in light of










NL PE NS NB QC ON MB SK AB (a) BC
50% inclusion of resource revenues
100% inclusion of resource revenues + offsets
Source: Dept. of Finance.
CALCULATION OF FISCAL CAPACITIES AND EQUALIZATION 
ENTITLEMENTS FOR 2008–09 
thousands of dollars per capita
Equalization standard with 50% 
inclusion of resource revenues 
($6,731 per capita)
Fiscal capacity of the lowest non-
receiving province with 100% inclusion 
of resource revenues
 (Ontario: $6,871 per capita)
(a) Alberta's fiscal capacity with 50% resource revenue inclusion is $10,673 and $12,579 with 100%  resource 
revenue inclusion.
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newly emerging fiscal events, but the general direc-
tions of the reforms seem reasonable. The new sys-
tem will likely remain the basis for determining
equalization for the foreseeable future.
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